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Abstract
This article considers the classic model of irreversible investment under imperfect
competition and stochastic demand, and characterizes the markov perfect equilibrium.
To do so, I introduce a new way to dene strategies, permitting the players to create
endogenous jumps in the state variable. The markov equilibrium is then similar to the
open-loop equilibrium, meaning that the irreversibility of investment does not create
a preemption e¤ect in this model. This is due to the form of investments cost, which
creates an incentive to invest as soon as possible, reducing the strategic interaction to
the one of a static problem.
Keywords: Capacity investment. Cournot competition. Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Real option games. Di¤erential games.
JEL classication: D43 L13 L25
Abstract
Cet article considère le modèle classique dinvestissement irréversible en environ-
nement Brownien lorsque la concurrence est imparfaite, et caractérise léquilibre Markovien.
Pour ce faire, jintroduis une nouvelle façon de dénir des stratégies, permettant aux
joueurs de faire sauter la variable détat. Léquilibre Markovien est alors similaire
à léquilibre en Open-loop, ce qui signie que, dans ce modèle, lirréversibilité de
linvestissement ne crée pas un e¤et de préemption dans ce modèle. Cela est dû à
la forme du coût de linvestissement, qui crée une incitation à investir dès que pos-
sible, en réduisant linteraction stratégique entre les entreprises à celui dun problème
statique.
Mots-clefs: Investissement en capacité. Concurrence à la Cournot. Equilibre markovien.
Option réelle. Jeux di¤érentielle.
2
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.79
1 Introduction
Investment in capacity of production has usually three main features. It is irreversible,
as a rm cannot recover its installation fees if it decides to dismantle some unit of capacity.
It is done in a long run perspective, with an uncertain evolution of the environment. It is
also often done in an imperfect competition framework. In that case, the commitment due
to the irreversibility of investment has an impact not only on the rm which invests, but
also on its opponents. Indeed, the competitors of the investing rm will have to deal with its
new capacity and should reduce or delay their own capacity adoption. This usually creates
a preemption e¤ect, as the investing rm may invest not just for the project value, but also
for its impact on opponentsfuture decisions.
This article considers the classic real option model of irreversible investment under
uncertainty and imperfect competition. It shows that, in this model, there is no preemption
e¤ect at the equilibrium. This is due to the form of investments cost, which creates an
incentive to invest as soon as possible and thus reduces the strategic interaction between
rms to the one of a static problem. This result shows that the irreversibility of investment
alone is not su¢ cient to create preemption, and provides a better understanding of the reason
driving preemption. This paper also introduces a renement of the theory of di¤erential
games, allowing strategic jumps in the state variable.
More precisely, I consider a duopoly producing an homogenous good, and competing
à la Cournot in a continuous time setting. The quantity produced by a rm depends of its
capacity. At each time, rms can decide to increase their capacity at a linear cost. Demand
evolves according to a continuous stochastic process, and capacities are smooth.
When there is a single rm in the market, the optimal strategy is well known. (See
for example Abel et al (1996) or Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). There exists a trigger, a level
of demand depending of the capacity of the rm, such that the monopoly invest only when
the demand exceeds the trigger, and then install the smaller level of capacity which releases
the trigger. As long as the demand is inferior to the trigger, the monopoly does nothing.
Under imperfect competition, this model has already been studied by several authors.
Baldursson (1998) and Grenadier (2002) assume that rms have the same behavior as the
monopoly, i.e. invest when demand reaches a trigger. They characterize the Nash equilibrium
3
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in triggersstrategy and show that competition makes the rms more reactive to demand.
Back and Paulsen (2009) and Steg (2012) show that the behavior assumed by Baldursson
(1998) and Grenadier (2002) is consistent with the concept of open-loop equilibrium. One
of the disadvantages of open loop equilibria is that they usually fail sub-game perfection.
Indeed, in open loop equilibrium, rms commit to their path of investment along time, and
the open loop equilibrium corresponds to the Nash equilibrium in these paths.
In markov perfect equilibrium1, rms decide of their investment in function of the
capacity repartition at the investment time. This equilibrium concept is a renement of sub-
game perfect equilibrium, and its comparison with open loop equilibria permits to identify
the strategic e¤ects in a game (see for example Figuières (2009) or Genc and Zaccour
(2014)). However, in our case of irreversible investment, there exists a di¢ culty to dene
a markovian strategy. Indeed, the linearity of the investments cost creates a incentives to
invest as soon as possible and the optimal path of capacity can presents some jumps2. Such
jumps are not allow in the usual theory of di¤erential games.
Back and Paulsen (2009) and Chevalier-Roignant, Huchzermeier and Trigeorgis
(2011) focus on markov perfect equilibrium. Back and Paulsen (2009) dene the strategy
of a rm in function of its opponent decisions3. Under that condition, they show that rms
can play strategies which ensure them the same prot as the open-loop equilibrium. In that
case, a rm can increase its prot by committing to an open loop strategy (according to the
fact that its opponent will reacts to its new strategy). This has often be interpreted as the
fact that the open loop equilibrium di¤ers from markov perfect equilibrium, as a rm can
preempt its opponent. This is misleading, as the possibility of preemption highly depends
on the assumption that the opponent will change its path of capacity. If the opponent
does not change its path of capacity, the preemption is not necessary protable. In fact,
1In this case, the notions of markov perfect equilibrium and of closed loop equilibrium coincide, as the
closed loop information structure is the state variable of markov perfect strategies.
2At the equilibrium, these jumps are made at the very rst moment of the game. However there exist sub-
games, which are not on the equilibrium path, in which rms make several jumps. It is therefore important,
for the determination of the markov perfect equilibrium, to permits the rm to jump at any time, and not
just on the rst moment of the game.
3In Back and Paulsen (2009), page 4538, the capacity choosed by rm i at time t depends of the capacity
of its opponents at the same time t.
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preemption is not protable, as open-loop and markov perfect equilibrium coincide. The
right interpretation of this result of Back and Paulsen (2009) should be that Stackelberg
equilibrium di¤ers from open-loop equilibrium, and that a rm which has the possibility
to commit to its open-loop strategy will have a higher prot than its markovian follower4.
Chevalier-Roignant, Huchzermeier and Trigeorgis (2011) use the usual theory of di¤erential
games to show that rms invest when the marginal revenue of capacity is higher than the
price of investment, where the competitive externality and the e¤ect of uncertainty are taken
into account in the marginal revenue of capacity. In that way, Tobins q theory is still valid.
The point of the present work will be to determine the marginal value of capacity and
therefore to fully characterizes the dynamic equilibrium.5
When there is no demand uncertainty, this model is similar to some classic papers on
dynamic oligopoly, as Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Reynolds (1991), or Figuières (2009),
except in the form of investments cost. Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) assume an exogenous
boundary on rmsinvestments, and show the existence of strategic e¤ects. Reynolds (1991)
and Figuières (2009) assume quadratic cost of investment and characterize the impact of
strategic e¤ects in function of the form of the competition. When there is complementarity
(i.e. in price competition), commitment to open-loop strategies decreases the prot of the
rms, whereas when there is substitutability (i.e. in quantity competition), commitment to
open-loop strategies decreases rmsprot.
In both papers, the strategic e¤ect comes from the fact that each rm has an uni-
lateral incentive to delay investment, due to an exogenous bound in the case of Fudenberg
and Tirole (1983), and to an investments cost increasing in the velocity of the investment
in Figuières (2009) or Reynolds (1991). In order to get the intuition when rms face a
linear cost I start focusing on a two period model without uncertainty. In that framework,
each rm knows that its opponents incentive to invest during the second period decreases
with the amount of capacity invested at the rst period. The strategic e¤ect should thus
increases the incentive to invest in the rst period. However, as rms can make money on
4Such interpretation should be taken carefully, as the denition of a Stackelberg equilibrium in such a
continuous setting is not straightforward.
5The results of Chevalier-Roignant, Huchzermeier and Trigeorgis (2011) is established in a more general
setting than the model of this work, as they consider a general investments cost function,with a disinvestment
possibility.
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both periods, there is no incentive to delay investment. The game is thus reduced to a one
shot game, and the strategic e¤ect of investment disappears. This highlights the fact that
both commitment and an incentive to delay investment are important to the creation of
strategic e¤ect in a simultaneous game.
When time is continuous, the optimal capacity path of the rms is not continuous in
time but presents some jumps. This is due to the linearity of investment cost, which creates
an incentive to invest as soon as possible. In order to introduce the possibility for the rm
to jump, I introduce a new control variable, the desired capacity. When the capacity of the
rm (which is the state variable) di¤ers from the desired capacity, the rm jumps to the
desired level of capacity. With this denition of rmsstrategy, I characterize the markov
perfect equilibrium. Both rms invest to a Cournot level of capacity if both have capacity
smaller than the Cournot level. When this is not the case, only the smallest of both rms
invests, except when it already has a capacity too large. Such investments take place at
the rst time of the game, and the markov perfect equilibrium coincides with the open-loop
equilibrium.
When demand evolves stochastically, the equilibrium strategies are the same. The
optimal levels of capacity depend on the solution of a di¤erential equation with smooth
pasting and value matching conditions, due the real option e¤ect. However, the equivalence
between open-loop and markov perfect equilibrium remains valid.
Section 2 describes the two period model. Section 3 presents the di¤erential game
without uncertainty, and section 4 the di¤erential game with uncertainty. Section 5 con-
cludes. All non-included proofs are given in appendix.
6
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2 Discrete game
2.1 The model
In order to understand why there is no strategic interaction under irreversible invest-
ment, lets focus on the simplest game of irreversible investment, with two periods6 and
without uncertainty. Consider a duopoly competing à la Cournot in capacities. Each rm
i, for i 2 fA;Bg, starts with some amount of capacity ki0 (ki0  0), which can be extended
through buying some assets. Purchases are made at a linear price p+ (p+ > 0). Let ki1 be
the capacity installed by rm i in the rst period, and ki2 the capacity installed in period 2.
Each rms production depends of its capacity, according to the technology qi = ki. Such
technology is classic in dynamic investment models, and has been used by Fudenberg and
Tirole (1983), Grenadier (2002), Merhi and Zervos (2007) among others7.
At each periods, rms produce and sell an homogenous good, at a price P
 
kit + k
j
t

depending of the total quantity sold on the market. The prot of rm i is thus;
i = P
 
kit + k
j
t

ki1   p+
 
ki1   ki0

+ 

P
 
kit + k
j
t

Ki2   p+
 
ki2   ki1

, (1)
where  2 [0; 1] is the discount rate. As investments are irreversible, rms i capacities should
verify:
ki2 > k
i
1 > k
i
0. (2)
In this game, I compare two kinds of equilibria concepts, open-loop equilibria and
sub-game perfect equilibria. In open-loop equilibria, at the beginning of the game, rms
commit on their action for the two periods, and then played a classic Nash equilibrium
where the strategy space is R2+. Formally, this gives:
6Two periods are needed in order to have some possibility of dynamic interaction (the action of a player
impacts the action of the other on the next period).
7As it was shown in Reynolds (1987), this technology assumption is also the result of a dynamic games
with limited Cournot competition, without uncertainty. Therefore we can relay this hypothesis in section 2
and 3 (for qi  ki). However when there is uncertainty, rms have an incentive to keep their unused capacity
for a possible further use in case of demand increases. Assuming that quantities are equal to capacities
permits to avoid such adaptability e¤ects and focus on the direct e¤ect of uncertainty on capacity choice.
7
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Open Loop Equilibrium: The group of strategies (kit )
i2fA;Bg
t2f1;2g is an open loop equilib-
rium if, for all i 2 fA;Bg,
i

k1; k

2; k
j
1 ; k
j
2

= max
Ki1;K
i
2
i

ki1; k
i
2; k
j
1 ; k
j
2

. (3)

In sub-game perfect equilibria, at each time rms choose their action knowing the
history of all the previous actions. Here, the choice of capacity in the second period depends
of the capacities installed in the rst period. The formal denition follows.
Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium: The group of strategies (ki1 ; ~k
i
2 )
i2fA;Bg, where ~ki2
is a function from R2+ to R+ and ki1 a real, is a sub-game perfect equilibrium if, for all
i 2 fA;Bg, the two following conditions are veried:
 for all vectors of capacity k1 2 R2+ installed in the rst period, ~ki2 veries:
i
h
ki1;
~ki2 (k1) ; k
j
1 ;
~kj2 (k1)
i
= max
~ki2(:)
i
h
ki1;
~ki2 (K1) ; K
j
1 K
j
2 (K1)
i
(4)
 the vector of rst period capacity, ki1 , veries:
i
h
ki1 ; ~k
i
2 (k

1) ; k
j
1 ;
~kj2 (k

1)
i
= max
ki1
i
h
ki1;
~ki2 (k1); k
j
1 ;
~kj2 (k

1)
i
. (5)

Equation (4) represents the fact that the strategies should be optimal in all sub-game,
i.e. whatever happens at the rst period, and not just on the equilibrium path.
Open-loop equilibria usually fails sub-game perfection, but are used as a benchmark
for discussing the e¤ects of dynamic strategic incentives, i.e. the incentives to change current
play so as to inuence the future play of opponents8. In the game considered here, the open-
loop equilibrium coincides with the sub-game perfect equilibrium, and there is no strategic
interaction.
8See for example Figuières (2009) or Genc and Zaccour (2014).
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2.2 An example
This sub-section focus on what happens with a linear price function P
 
kAt + k
B
t

=
1   kAt   kBt . It solves the model by backward induction, in order to give intuition on the
lack of strategic e¤ect under irreversible investment, and on the proof of proposition 1.
In the last period, given the capacity of period one, the best response of rm A is
given by
kA2 (k
B
2 ) = max

1  p+   kB2
2
; kA1

. (6)
Therefore, there exist three possibilities, in function of the capacities installed at the rst
period. Both rms are constrained (In the meaning that they wish to have a capacity in
period 2 inferior to their capacity in period 1). One rm is constrained and the other is not.
No rms are constrained.
When no rms are constrained, the equilibrium is straightforward, both rms in-
vesting until the usual Cournot level. This happens when kA1 and k
B
1 are smaller than the
Cournot equilibrium, 1 p
+
3
. When rm A is constrained and rm B is not, rm B installed
a capacity kB2 =
1 p+ KA1
2
. If kB1 >
1 p+ KA1
2
, then rm B has no interest to invest, and both
rms are constrained. Graphic 1 presents the area where rms are constraint, in function of
the capacities chosen in the rst period, and Graphic 2 the equilibrium of second period.
[Insert Graphic 1]
[Insert Graphic 2]
In the rst period, a rm has two possibilities. Choosing a capacity which will
constrained him in the second period, or choosing a capacity which will not. If rm A
chooses a capacity which does not constraint her, its best response is:
kA1 (k
B
1 ) = max

1  p+   kB1
2
; kA0

, (7)
so rm A wishes to be constrained in the second period. This is due to the fact that a unit
of capacity brings the same level of prot in the rst and in the second period, and there
is no interest to delay investment. Therefore, at the closed loop equilibrium, rms have the
same level of capacity in both periods. Such level maximizes
For i 2 fA;Bg, i = (1 + )  1  ki1   kj1 ki1   p+  ki1   ki0 . (8)
9
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Therefore, the equilibrium strategy of rm A is to install the Cournot level if rm B
starts with a capacity inferior to the Cournot:
kA2 = k
A
1 = max
(
1  p+
(1+)
3
; kA0
)
if kB0 
1  p+
(1+)
3
, (9)
and to install the best response to rm Bs initial level when rm Bs capacity exceed the
Cournot level:
kA2 = k
A
1 = max
(
1  p+
(1+)
  kB0
2
; kA0
)
if kB0 >
1  p+
(1+)
3
. (10)
Firm B has the same equilibrium strategy. In some way, this game is equivalent to a one-shot
game, where rms invest for both periods. This is due to the linearity of investment cost,
which overthrow the incentives to delay investment. The next section will show that the
same e¤ect happens in a di¤erential game. Before that, the following sub-section presents
this result for general demand and cost function.
2.3 The proposition
In order to present proposition 1, let kiIrr(K
j) be the best response of rm i for i 2
fA;Bg, when rm i has no initial capacity and rm j has the same capacity in both periods,
i.e. kj. kiIrr is dened as the implicit solution to the following equation:
P
 
kiIrr + k
j

+ P 0
 
kiIrr + k
j

kiIrr =
p+
1 + 
: (11)
Let also kC be the Cournot level of capacity when both rms has no initial value, i.e. the
solution to
kAIrr(k
B
C ) = k
A
C and k
B
Irr(k
A
C) = k
B
C . (12)
In order to ensure the existence of kiIrr and kC , I make the following assumption:
H1: P is a concave, twice di¤erentiable positive function.
This assumption permits to state proposition 1.
Proposition 1: Assume H1. Let (kit )
i2fA;Bg
t2f1;2g be the strategies dened by:
10
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For i 2 fA;Bg ; ki2 = ki1 =
8<: max

kiIrr(k
j
0); k
i
0
	
if kj0 > k
j
C
max

kjC ; k
i
0
	
if kj0  kjC
. (13)
Then, (kit )
i2fA;Bg
t2f1;2g is the unique open loop equilibrium of the game. It is also the only
sub-game perfect equilibrium.
As seen in the example, the linearity of the investment price overthrows the incentives
to delay investment. This reduces the strategic interaction to the rst period game, and
explains the equivalence of the notion of open-loop and equilibrium in that game.
3 Dynamic game without uncertainty
3.1 Model and denition
This section presents a dynamic model of investment in capacity under imperfect com-
petition. It shows that, under some smoothness condition, the markovian equilibria are
similar to the one shot game previously considered, and there is no preemption e¤ect.
Let kit be the capital of rm i at time t, time is continuous and capacity partially
reversible. Let i(kt) be the instantaneous payo¤ of rm i, kt being the vector of rms
capacities. I assume Cournot competition. Let P (:) be the inverse demand function. The
instantaneous revenue of rm i is
i(kt) = P
 
kt

kit, (14)
where kt =
Pn
i=1 k
i
t, as previously. The interest rate is r and the purchase price of capacity is
p+. As investment is irreversible, the path of investment, kit, is assumed to be an increasing
function of the time. The total prot of rm i at time 0 is thus:
i =
Z +1
0
e rti(kt)dt  p+
Z +1
0
e rtdkit. (15)
The objective of rm i is to choose the process kit which maximizes its own expected prot,
given the initial levels of capital and demand. Obviously, the optimal process will depend of
11
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the processes chosen by the other players. To properly dene the game, I must dene the
strategic variable used by the players.
In this framework, the usual theory of di¤erential games assume that the path of
investment of the rm is described by the ow of investment I it :
@kit
@t
= I it , (16)
and that the strategic variable of the players is the ow of investment. Coming from an
initial value, the ow of investment describe a unique capacity path. Equation (16) implicitly
assume that this capacity path is a continuous function of the time (as it is di¤erentiable).
In most of the application of di¤erential game, such assumption is natural. However, in case
of irreversible investment, the linearity of investment cost might create an incentive to install
the desired capacity as soon as possible. Indeed, the Bellman formula gives:
ri = sup
Ii

P
 
k

ki   p+I i + I i @
i
@Ki
+ I i
@i
@K i

. (17)
The optimal investment policy maximizes9 I i @
i
@Ki
 p+I i, and when @i
@Ki
< p+ the rm has no
incentives to invest. When @
i
@Ki
> p+, the optimal ow of investment I it is innite: the rm
wishes to install its new capacity as soon as possible. This creates a jump in the optimal
capacity process of the rms, which is not allowed by (16).
To address this di¢ culty, I introduce a new control variable,Kit , which is the capacity
desired by rm i at time t. If this desired capacity is equal to the installed capacity, kit, the
rm continue to invest in a continuous way. If the desired capacity is di¤erent from the
installed capacity, the rm installs the desired capacity. Formally, this is expressed in the
following denition.
Denition: The investment game previously considered is in its jump-control form if:
(i) a strategy of player i is a pair (Kit ; I
i
t)t2R+, where for each t, (K
i
t ; I
i
t) 2 R2+.
(ii) the state variable at time t, kt = (k1t ; k
2
t ), is dened by the two equations:
@+kit
@t
= I it , (18)
9This is the case under markovian or open-loop equilibrium. The choice of the equilibrium concept
impacts only the di¤erential equation determining rmsprot.
12
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and
lim
s!t
s>t
kis = K
i
t , (19)
where k0 is the given initial level of capital, and @
+
@t
denotes the right-hand derivatives.10
(iii) the strategic variables of player i is its level of investment, I it , and the desired capacity
Kit . 
Equation (19) states than the installed capacity kit is continuous if and only if K
i
t =
kit. When the strategies are functions of the state variable, rm i jumps as long as k
i
t 6= ~Ki(kt).
Graphic 3 introduces two examples of strategies than can be follow, and their implication in
term of capacity installation.
[Insert Graphic 3]
In such framework, the strategy of player i is markovian if its strategy is only function
of the state variable (rms capacity and level of demand), i.e. if there exists ~Ki(:) and ~I i(:)
such that
Kit =
~Ki(kt) and I it = ~I
i(kt). (20)
A strategy is an open-loop strategy if Kt and It only depends on the time, and not on the
installed capacity kt.
The denition of the jump-control form permits to extend the class of capacity path
from the class of continuous functions implicitly assumed by (16) to the class of the left-
hand continuous function with right-hand derivative. However, this denition allows multiple
jumps: a jump of rm i can imply a jump of its opponents in reaction, which can bring a
new jump of rm i, and so on... In order to prevent such multiple jumps, I introduce the
following assumption.
H2: The strategies of the rms i veries assumption H2 if, for all k 2 Rn+,
~K

~K(k)

= ~K(k). (21)
10As process kt can be discontinuous in t, the right-hand derivative is dened by:
@+kit
@t = limn!+1
l kit+h
h ,
where l = lims>t
s!t
kis.
13
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A markov perfect equilibrium in the markovian state-control form is dened as a
vector of functions

~K (:) ; ~I (:)

=

~K1 (:) ; ~I1 (:) ; ::; ~Kn (:) ; ~In (:)

such that, for all
rm i 2 f1; ::; ng and for all other markovian strategy of rm i,

~K 0i (:) ; ~I 0i (:)

;
8k 2 Rn+; i(kt )  i(k0t), (22)
where kt is the path dened by (18) and (19) and the strategies

~K (:) ; ~I (:)

, and k0t is
the path created when rm i uses the strategy

~K 0i (:) ; ~I 0i (:)

instead of

~Ki (:) ; ~Ii (:)

,
and the other rm does not change their strategies. Furthermore, a markovian strategy for
rm i is said continuous if the function ~Ki is continuous, and a continuous markov perfect
equilibrium is a markov perfect equilibrium with continuous strategy.
To my knowledge, this is a new way of modeling di¤erential games. In this context,
it permits to properly dene the possibility to jump.
3.2 Characterization of the continuous markov equilibrium
As in the case of the discrete game, let kiIrr(k
j) be the best response of rm i when rm
i has no initial capacity and its opponent install the level kj at the beginning of the game
and maintain the same level afterwards. kiIrr is dened by:
P (kiIrr + k
j) + P 0(kiIrr + k
j)kiIrr = rp
+, (23)
and the Cournot level, kC , is given by:
kAIrr(k
B
C ) = k
A
C and k
B
Irr(k
A
C) = k
B
C . (24)
Assumption H1 is required in order to be sure that equations (23) and (24) are well dened.
Proposition 2 shows that rms have interest to invest at the beginning of the game,
and to keep their capacity forever after that. This is the situation in both the continuous
markov perfect equilibrium and the open-loop equilibrium. Indeed, as the linearity of in-
vestment cost overthrows the incentives to delay investment, everything happens like in a
one-shot game, and there is no preemption e¤ect.
14
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Proposition 2: Assume H1 and H2. Let ( ~Ki; ~I)i2fA;Bg be the markovian strategies
dene by:
For i 2 fA;Bg ; Ki(kt) =
8<: max

kiIrr(k
j
0); k
i
0
	
if kj0 > k
j
C
max fkiC ; ki0g if kj0  kjC
and ~Ii(At; kt) = 0. (25)
Then, ( ~Ki; ~I)i2fA;Bg is the unique continuous markov perfect equilibrium of the game. It
is also the unique open loop equilibrium.
4 Dynamic game with uncertainty
In this subsection, I characterize the continuous markovian equilibrium when demand
evolves randomly. At is the parameter of demand, following a di¤usion process:
dAt = (At)dt+ (At)dWt; (26)
where Wt is a standard Wiener process. The price at time t is now a function of the
parameter of demand at time t and of the capacities of the rm at time t. The revenue of
rm i at time t is thus:
i(kt) = P
 
At; k
1
t + k
2
t

kit. (27)
In this real option game model, similar to the one of Grenadier (2002), Back and
Paulsen (2009) or Chevalier-Roignant, Huchzermeier and Trigeorgis (2011) there is no
strategic e¤ects. As previously, this is due to the linearity of investments cost, which over-
throws the incentives to delay investment. The introduction of uncertainty does not change
the strategic interaction. In order to prove this result, I make the following assumptions:
H3: P (:) is a positive function, four times di¤erentiable, such that P 0  0, P 00  0.
H4: (A) and (A) are continuous functions, and verify the Lipschitz conditions.
H5: There exists a function G : R+ ! R+, such that, 8(A; x) 2 R  R+, xP (A; x) <
G(A), and
R +1
0
e rtG(At)dt < +1.
The high order of di¤erentiability in assumption H3 is needed in order to use Itos
Lemma and to inverse Itos Lemma results. H4 is classic to ensure the existence of a strong
15
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solution to (26). H5 ensures the existence of the stochastic integral determining the prot
of the rms.
In order to states proposition 2, let v be the expected price when no rms change
their capacity. v is a solution to the di¤erential equation:
8x > 0; rv(A; x) = P (A; x) + (A) @v
@A
(A; x) +
2(A)
2
@2v
(@A)2
(A; x), (28)
and should verify that, for all (A; k) such that
sup
i2fA;Bg

v
 
A; k

+
@v
@k
 
A; k

ki

= p+, (29)
then
@v
@A
 
A; k

+ ki
@2v
@A@k
 
A; k

= 0. (30)
The conditions (29) and (30) are the value matching and smooth pasting conditions. As
previously, I dene kiIrr(A; k
j), the optimal level of investment of rm i for a level of demand
A, by
v
 
A; kiIrr + k
j

+
@v
@k
 
A; kiIrr + k
j

kiIrr = p
+ (31)
and kC , the Cournot equilibrium, by
kAIrr(k
B
C ) = k
A
C and k
B
Irr(k
A
C) = k
B
C . (32)
Remark that the Cournot level, kC , depends on the level of demand, A. With these denition,
rms jump at the beginning of the game and make their capacity evolves continuously
with the continuous evolution of demand. This continuity of rmsdecision overthrow the
possibility of strategic e¤ect, as it is seen in theorem 2.
Proposition 3: Assume H2, H3, H4 and H5. Let ( ~Ki; ~I)i2fA;Bg be the markovian
strategies dene by:
For i 2 fA;Bg ; Ki(At; kt) =
8<: max

kiIrr(At; k
j
t ); k
i
t
	
if kjt > k
j
C
max fkiC(At); kitg if kjt  kjC
and ~Ii(At; kt) = 0.
(33)
Then, ( ~Ki; ~I)i2fA;Bg is the unique continuous markov perfect equilibrium of the game. It
is also the unique open loop equilibrium.
16
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An important point concerning proposition 2 and 3 is that it focus only on con-
tinuous markov perfect equilibrium. However there exists a range of other markov perfect
equilibrium, as the state variable contains enough information on the past of the game to
implement punishment strategies. The continuous markov perfect equilibrium has some in-
teresting properties. It assumes some regularity on the decisions of the rms: a small change
in the state variable should not imply an important change in rmsactions. It is unique.
When the rms are initially symmetric, it is equivalent to the Cournot equilibrium. For
these reasons, I ll condent enough to claim that the continuous markov perfect equilib-
rium describes the regular equilibrium of the market. It plays the same role as the stage
game in a repeated game framework.
5 Conclusion
This work shows that, in the classic model of irreversible investment in capacity, there
is no preemption e¤ect. This is due to the linearity of investment price which destroys any
incentive to delay investment, and thus the possibility to inuence future decisions. The
introduction of uncertainty does not change the nature of strategic interactions between
players (at least as long as the uncertainty is a generalized Brownian motion and evolves
continuously). These results contradict the intuition of the real option game literature. The
possibility of preemption, found in models of entry (models of investment in a single project),
may not be valid for investment in capacity, as long as the capacity is su¢ ciently smooth.
These results are highly dependent on the nature of the investments cost. In the
industrial organization literature, there exists two other assumption which permits to recover
the strategic e¤ects. The rst one is to assume quadratic cost of investment, as in Figuières
(2009). Quadratic investment cost creates incentives to always postpone a part of the
remaining investment. A monopoly with quadratic cost will never achieve its stationary
capacity, even in a static environment. The second possibility is to assume linear investments
cost but also an exogenous boundary on the ow of investment of the rms, as in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1983). In that case both rms invest as much as they can, until the marginal
value of their investment is inferior to the investment cost. The path of capacities is thus
17
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highly dependent on the exogenous boundary, representing the nancial constraint of the
rm. It is this nancial constraint which creates the strategic e¤ects. Recent empirical
papers, as Angelini and Generale (2008) and Bottazzi et al. (2014) shows that small rms
are more restricted than large rms on the capital market. It suggests that strategic e¤ects
should be more accurate one market composed of small rms than on market composed of
large competitors.
On a game theory perspective, this work contributes to extend the theory of di¤eren-
tial games, introducing a way to dene strategies which enables players to create endogenous
jumps in the state variable. In this framework, there exists a multiplicity of markovian equi-
librium, as in discrete dynamic games with innite time-horizon, but only one of them is
describe by a strategy continuous in the state variable.
6 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1:
In step 1 and 2, I show that in any sub-game perfect equilibrium (kit )
i2fA;Bg
t2f1;2g , rms
have the same capacity in period 1 and 2. Existence, unicity and characterization of this
equilibrium follow. Step 3 focuses on open-loop equilibrium.
Step 1: In this step, I show that for all choices of capacity made in the rst period, the
equilibrium is:
For i 2 fA;Bg ; ki2 =
8<: max
n
k^iIrr(k
j
1 ); k
i
1
o
if kj1 > k^
j
C
max
n
k^jC ; k
i
1
o
if kj1  k^jC
, (34)
where k^iIrr(k
j
1 ) is implicitly dened by
P

k^iIrr + k
j

+ P 0

k^iIrr + k
j

kiIrr = p
+, (35)
and k^C by
k^AIrr(k^
B
C ) = k^
A
C and k^
B
Irr(k^
A
C) = k^
B
C . (36)
18
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The existence of k^Irr is due to assumption 2. The existence and unicity of k^C comes
from Novshek (1985). Novshek (1985) also implies that the equilibrium of the last stage
game exists and is unique (the prot function of the last stage veries the assumption of
theorem 3).
The best response of rm i is
ki2 = max
n
k^iIrr(k
j
1 ); k
i
1
o
. (37)
Therefore, if opponent of rm i have a capacity inferior to the Cournot level, the equilibrium
strategy of rm i will be to install the Cournot level, except if its capacity already exceed
this level. If the capacity of its opponents exceed the Cournot level, rm i will invest until
its best response level, knowing that the other rm will not invest (if rm j invest until its
best response level, both rms install the Cournot level).
Step 2: This step shows that, at the equilibrium, rms are constraint in the second
period. Assume that ki2 > k
i
1 , for one i. Then, there is two possibility: rst k
j
1 > k^
j
C and
ki2 = k^
i
Irr(k
j
1 ) > k
i
1 . In that case, the prot of rm i in the rst period is
ijrst period = P
 
ki1 + k
j
1

ki1   p+
 
ki1   ki0

(38)
which is a concave function of ki1, with a maximum in k^
i
Irr(k
j
1 ). However, k
i
1 < k^
i
Irr(k
j
1 ), and
rm 1 does not invest until its best response level, which contradict the fact that (kit )
i2fA;Bg
t2f1;2g
is an equilibrium.
The second possibility is that kj1 < k^
j
C and k
i
2 = k^
j
C > k
i
1 . In that case, the prot
of rm i is the same as (38), and, as (kit )
i2fA;Bg
t2f1;2g is an equilibrium, k
i
1 = k^
i
Irr(k
j
1 ). Using
the theorem of implicit function to (35) implies that k^iIrr(:) is a decreasing function of the
capacity of rm is opponent. Therefore, as kj1 < k^
j
C , k
i
1 > k^
i
Irr(k^
j
C) = k^
j
C , which contradict
the fact that rm i is not constrained.
At equilibrium, rms do not invest in the second period. The sub-game perfect
equilibrium can thus be seen as a one shot game, and the characterization of the equilibrium,
as presented in proposition 1, comes from the same reasoning as step 1.
Step 3: Assume that (kit )
i2fA;Bg
t2f1;2g is an open loop equilibrium, and that rm A is not
constrained in the second period (kA2 > k
A
1 ). Then, by denition,
kA2 = argmax

P
 
ki2 + k
j
2

ki2   p+
 
ki2   ki0

(39)
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and
kA1 = argmax

P
 
ki1 + k
j
1

ki1   (1  ) p+ki1

. (40)
Let X(kj; y) be the solution to the implicit equation
P
 
X + kj

+ P 0
 
X + kj

X = y: (41)
By assumption H1, (41) is well dened, and, by application of the theorem of implicit func-
tion, decreasing in kj and y. Furthermore, kA2 = X(k
j
2 ; p
+) and kA1 = X(k
j
1 ; (1  ) p+).
As by assumption kj2  kj1 ,
kA2 = X(k
j
2 ; p
+)  X(kj1 ; p+) < X(kj1 ; (1  ) p+) = kA1 . (42)

In the following proof, I put the time in index when I consider a variable as a
stochastic process and nothing in index when I consider the variable as a constant. Thereby,
ki = ~Ki (A; k) is the capacity implemented by rm i for a level of demand A and a vector of
installed capacity k, whereas Kit = ~K
i (At; kt) is the stochastic process implemented during
a period of time.
Theorem 1 is a particular case of theorem 2. In order to prove theorem 2, I dene
H, the set of state variables such that no rms jump:
H =
n
(A; k) j ~K(A; k) = k
o
. (43)
Proof of theorem 2:
The proof is devised in four steps. The rst step characterizes the optimal strategy
and the prot function when both rms belong to H. The second step ensures that the
implicit functions expressed in (31) are well dened. To do so, I show that the prot functions
are concave (inH). Third step described the equilibrium, and the last step fully characterizes
the prot functions using the smooth pasting and value-matching conditions.
Step 1: Characterization of the prot functions when (A; k) belongs to H i.
If the initial point (A; k) belongs to H, Bellman theorem applies and:
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ri(A; k) = max
Ii

i (A; k)  p+  I i
+
  p   I i  + I i @i@Ki +Di

, (44)
where Di does not depend of the control I i. If @
i
@Ki
 p+, then the optimal control is I i = 0.
If @
i
@Ki
> p+, then there is no optimal control available in R, and rm i wishes to jump. The
same works for rm j, and, H veries
H =

k 2 R2+ j for i 2 fA;Bg ,
@i
@Ki
 p+

. (45)
Inside H, the best strategy of each rm is to maintain its capacity constant and thus the
rms prot depends only on the evolution of the uncertainty. Therefore, for all i 2 fA;Bg,
ri = i (A; k) + (A)
@i
@A
+
2(A)
2
@2i
@A2
. (46)
The solutions to this di¤erential equation have the form
i(A; k) = v
 
A; k

ki, (47)
where v is a solution to:
rv(A; x) = P (A; x) + (A)
@v
@A
(A; x) +
2(A)
2
@2v
(@A)2
(A; x). (48)
This permits to pass from two di¤erential equations in (46) to a unique one in (48). However,
this di¤erential equation can still have many solutions.
Step 2: Concavity of the prot functions
The principal di¢ culty of that step is that (48) denes v only on H. So I will use a
general solution to (48), w, and show that assumption H3 implies the concavity of v.
Let w(A; x) be a solution to (48) for all (A; x) 2 R2+. Using Itô Lemma on the
function e rtw(At; k) gives:
d
 
e rtw(At; k)

=

(At)
@w
@A
(At; k) +
2(At)
2
@2w
(@A)2
(At; k)  rw(At; k)

e rtdt
+ (At)e
 rt@w
@A
(At; k)dWt.
By (48), this equation becomes
d
 
e rtw(At; k)

=  P  At; k e rtdt+ (At)e rt@w
@A
(At; k)dWt, (49)
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which can be rewritten, for h > 0,
8A0 2 R+; w(A0; k)  e rhw(Ah; k) =
Z h
0
P
 
At; k

e rtdt 
Z h
0
(At)e
 rt@w
@A
(At; k)dWt
(50)
and thus
w(A0; k)  e rhE

w(Ah; k)jA0

= E
Z h
0
P
 
At; k

e rtdt j A0

. (51)
When h! +1, (51) becomes,
w(A0; k) = E
Z +1
0
P
 
At; k

e rtdt j A0

. (52)
Assumption H5 implies that this integral is well dened. Assumption H3 implies that v0 < 0
and v00 < 0, so w veries assumptionH1. Furthermore, onH, w(A; k) is a particular solution
to the di¤erential equation (48), and, as v is also a solution to (48), there exists a function
g(:) such that, on H:
v(A; k) = g(A) + w(A; k), (53)
thus v also veries assumption H1.
Step 3: Equilibrium outside H.
Assume now that, for one rm, the optimal strategy is to jump at the initial point
(A; k). Let k^i be the vector of capacity just after the jump:
k^ = ~K (k) .
If k^i = ki, rm i does not jump. By assumption H2, rms do not jump just after a jump,
and k^ 2 J . Then, the prot of rm i is equal to:
i(A; k) = i

A; k^

  p+max

k^i   ki0; 0

. (54)
As v veries assumption H1, the implicit theorem ensures the existence of (31). Then,
there is two possibilities:
 If both rms have capacity inferior to the Cournot level, as dened by (32), rms
invest until the Cournot level.
 If rm i have a capacity higher than the Cournot level, ki > kiC , then its opponents
will jump until k^j = kjIrr(k
i) whereas rm i keep its capacity constant. If rm j has a
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capacity higher than its best response to rm is capacity, kj > kjIrr(k
i) then no rms invest,
and k 2 H.
This gives the unicity and the form of equilibrium for any solution of (48). However, v
should also verify the smooth-pasting and value matching conditions.
Step 4: Smooth pasting and value-matching condition.
Let k 2 H(A). Let A+ be the level of demand such that one rm invests if the
demand increases over this level. Then, if rm i is a rm which invests just after A+, the
prot function of rm i should verify,
@i
@ki
 
A+; k

= p+. (55)
If rm i does not invest just after A+,
@i
@ki
 
A+; k

< p+. (56)
The smooth pasting condition is thus
max

@A
@kA
 
A+; k

;
@B
@kB
 
A+; k

= p+, (57)
which can be written as:
sup
i2fA;Bg

v
 
A+; k

+
@v
@k
 
A+; k

ki

= p+. (58)
The di¤erentiation of (55) gives the optimal matching condition:
@2i
@A@ki
 
A+; k

= 0, (59)
for all i which maximizes (57), which can be written
@v
@A
 
A+; k

+
@2v
@A@ki
 
A+; k

ki = 0. (60)
Equations (58), (60), characterizes the solution of the di¤erential equation (48).
At this point of the proof the prot function of rm i can be rewritten:
i(A; k) = max
KijK2H(A)

v
 
A; K

Ki  max  Ki   ki; 0	 , (61)
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where v is a solution to the di¤erential equation (48), which veries (58) and (60). As v
veries assumption H1, the same reasoning as in the last step of the discrete game gives us
theorem 2.

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HGraphic 2: Second period equilibrium 
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